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NEW APPROACHES TO THE CONTROL OF
OLIGOPOLY *
Louis B. SoR-wARTz f
Every undertaking to prohibit, regulate, or control monopoly and
restraint of trade must approach the subject from two points of view:
structure and practices.1 From the point of view of structure, legislation
must seek to prevent concentration of private control of markets into
too few hands-that is, to prevent mergers and other relatively rigid
unifications of interest and management, and to break up existing
excessive concentrations. From the point of view of practices, the aim
must be to prevent certain types of concerted action by agreement or
understanding among independent firms whose size alone presumably
does not offend the rules as to industry structure.
It is remarkable that this two-level operation of the antitrust laws
may permit a structural change-a unification of firms by merger or
holding company control-where it would not tolerate restrictive agree-
ments between the same firms, although the market control involved in
the latter arrangement is far less comprehensive and enduring and pre-
sumably, therefore, less dangerous. The explanation for this paradox is
said to be that unifications often have technological justifications, espe-
cially economies of scale, which we do not wish to limit by law. A star-
tling consequence of this paradox of antitrust regulation is that the en-
actment of a law preventing temporary combinations is likely to lead to
a wave of mergers and permanent consolidations to replace the newly
forbidden restrictive agreements. The process of consolidation will
go on to the limit of the law. Where this limit is high, as it has been
in the United States, major industries will typically come to be dom-
inated by two, three, or four firms-that is, by an oligopoly. Econo-
mists tell us that oligopolies function like monopolies, or as if there
were agreements among the leading firms even though no such agree-
* This Article is adapted from a paper given at the International Conference
on Restraints of Competition, sponsored by the Institute for Foreign and Interna-
tional Trade Regulation, and held in Frankfurt, Germany, during June 1960. The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Silas Spengler, Class of 1960, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School, in preparing this Article for publication and
especially in compiling the tables which appear in the appendices.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1932, LL.B. 1935, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania.
1 The problem is reviewed in Johnston & Stevens, Monopoly or Monopolization-
A Reply to Professor Rostow, 44 ILL. L. Rnv. 269 (1949); Levi, A Two Level
Anti-Monopoly Law, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 567 (1952); Rostow, Monopoly Unzder the
Sherman; Act: Power or Purpose, 43 ILL. L. Rv. 745 (1949).
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ments exist. Through price leadership, mutual deference, fear, or
simple recognition of what is in their common interest, they will main-
tain prices above competitive levels, refuse to supply new distributors,
and postpone introduction of new and cheaper techniques involving the
rapid obsolescence of old investment.
Faced with this situation, a government having an antitrust policy
must make up its mind whether: (1) to revise the structural part of its
antitrust law so that it does not tolerate "oligopoly"; (2) to revise the
practices part of its antitrust law so that coordinated action which would
be illegal when done by agreement becomes illegal without proof of
agreement; (3) to do nothing about the situation, on the theory that
concentration to the level of oligopoly is necessary to achieve economies
of scale and thus serves the public interest notwithstanding the im-
pairment of competition; or (4) to establish public control of price and
other economic decisions of "oligopolists" to prevent abuse of the
monopolistic power which it is said they inherently possess.
Which course should be taken depends on what we know about
oligopolies, the ease and precision with which they can be identified,
their effects, and the extent to which other forces in the economy may
counteract their monopolistic tendencies. These are economic prob-
lems. The lawyer's problem is to translate such knowledge into
comprehensible and effective regulation. How the legislators, judges,
administrators, and lawyers of different countries have essayed this task
will be discussed later in this Article, after we have first examined the
state of economic knowledge in the field.
When is an industry properly characterized as oligopolistic or
dangerously oligopolistic? As might be expected, no firm and dear
answer can be given. The variables in the economic formula are too
numerous and each of the variables is difficult to measure. In the first
place, there are the difficulties of defining an "industry" and securing
the relevant statistics.2 The more firms and products we lump together
in a single industry, the smaller will seem the share of any one firm or
group of firms. Are steel, aluminum, and copper separate industries?
Or are they, because of a degree of interchangeability, to be considered a
single field of "basic metals"? Or should we draw the industry
2 As to the various bases on which concentration may be calculated, compare
FTC, REPORT ON THE CONCENTRATION OF PRODucTIvE FACILITIES (1947) (percentage
of industry's net capital assets), with KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959) (percentage of total market sales). Ex-
tracts from both studies are set forth in the appendices to this Article. See also
the three articles in NATIONAL BUREAU OF EcONOmIc RESEARCH, BUSINESS Cox-
CENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY (1955): Miller, Measures of Monopoly Power and
Concentration: Their Economic Significance at 119; Rosenbluth, Measures of Con-
centration at 57; and Scitovsky, Economic Theory and the Measurement of Con-
centration at 101.
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boundaries with reference to particular forms of fabrication, so that
we differentiate an iron industry from a steel industry, and treat "wire
and cable" as one industry embracing products made of steel, aluminum,
or copper? 3
When we have determined what products and firms to consider as
single industries, we must also calculate the geographic boundaries of
their "markets," because firms making even identical products in
different territories, isolated from each other, do not act as competitive
checks upon each other. The important word here is "isolated":
market regions may be isolated or partially isolated by geographic
remoteness entailing prohibitive freights, or by political barriers such
as tariffs, quotas, or exchange controls. Markets may also be effec-
tively segregated by private cartels or unspoken understandings under
which potentially competitive international firms do not challenge each
other's dominance in particular export markets. In some instances
markets can be made to appear larger than their natural boundaries,
as where trade association adherence to a system of basing point prices
keeps delivered prices high enough to enable firms to do business in
localities remote from their plants.' Such difficulties and uncertainties
severely restrict the utility of "oligopoly" as a regulatory concept.5
The best effort to date to translate the nebulous concept of oligop-
oly into specific guides for administrative action is the 1959 book by
Professors Kaysen and Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and
Legal Analysis.6 Their criterion and classification of oligopolies are
summarized in the following quotation:
A structurally oligopolistic market is one in which the few
largest sellers in the market have a share of the market sufficient to
make it likely that they will recognize the interaction of their own
behavior and their rivals' response in determining the values of
the market variables. Neither economic theory nor experience
provides a definite number of firms or a size of market share they
must jointly hold for this logic to apply. As our dividing point
we have adopted, somewhat arbitrarily, a market share of one
third of total market sales for the eight largest sellers, because in
3 On the problems of industry and business classification, see Conklin & Gold-
stein, Censts Principles of Industry and Product Claisification, Manufacturing In-
dustries, in NATIONAL BuREAu OF EcONomiC RESEARCH, op. cit. smpra note 2, at 15,
and the comments which follow by Fabricant at 36, Kottke at 40, and Suits at 48.
4 See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); FTC v. A. E. Staley
Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
5 Cf. NATIONAL BuaRAu OF EcoNOMIc REsEARcH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 57-140,
where leading economists, especially Feilner at 113, Kaysen at 116-18, and Miller
at 119, express pervasive skepticism regarding the significance of various indices
of concentration.
6 This book is reviewed by Professor Ralph F. Fuchs in the book review section
of this issue.
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the majority of markets with which we are familiar, a smaller
number of firms with larger shares of the market generally ac-
company, to a significant degree, the kind of behavior indicated
above. Beyond such a dividing point, the majority of markets with
which we are familiar do not appear to function in this fashion.
Within the general classification of structure oligopoly we
make a distinction between two subclasses. In what we call Type
One structural oligopoly, the first eight firms have at least 50
percent of total market sales and the first twenty firms have at least
75 percent of total market sales. In Type One oligopoly, recogni-
tion of interdependence by the leading firms is extremely likely,
and the 75 percent share of the first twenty sellers makes it likely
that the response of the smaller sellers will not limit the behavior
of the larger firms. Type Two structural oligopoly is defined by
a market share of 33 percent for the eight largest sellers, with the
rest of the market relatively unconcentrated.
The distinguishing feature of this market is the existence of
an unconcentrated sector which may constitute a competitive re-
straint of varying significance on the concentrated firms. Em-
pirical studies of such markets indicate no clear presumption on
the importance of an unconcentrated sector in an oligopolistic
market, and so this partial oligopolistic market is classified as a
separate category within the general classification of concentrated
markets.
The economic concept of a market is stated in terms of the
behavior of buyers and sellers. Two products belong in the same
market if a small change in price (or product) causes a significant
diversion in a relatively short time of the buyers' purchases or the
sellers' production from one product to another.7
Kaysen and Turner distinguish, in their statistics and analysis,
between concentration in large industries and in small industries, on the
ground that public concern is greater in the former. The study also
discriminates between concentration in investment goods and input
sectors of the economy, and concentration in consumer goods, because
the evil effects of noncompetitive pricing at preconsumer levels are
amplified at the later ones. An effort was also made to distinguish
national, regional, and "heterogeneous" markets, for one or two firms
might well dominate a regional market although national figures, which
may be the only ones available, do not reveal high concentration in the
industry. In the first appendix to this Article, a table based on the
Kaysen-Turner study but omitting some of the foregoing refinements
shows the "minimum" concentration which Kaysen and Turner found
7 KAYSEIN & TuaRNR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 27-28.
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in various industries, arranged in descending order according to ag-
gregate concentration in the largest eight firms of each industry.8
It should be emphasized that the Kaysen-Turner criterion of undue
concentration-that the eight largest sellers have more than one third
of the business-rests upon their judgment that "in a majority of the
markets with which we are familiar" the large sellers are "likely" to
recognize the interaction of their own behavior "to a significant degree."
Inasmuch as the empirical basis for this judgment is not set forth, its
reliability even for the United States is subject to challenge. Obviously,
the judgment does not have even prima facie validity in other countries
where entirely different relationships between market structure and
firm behavior might be observed. But the Kaysen-Turner criterion is
put forward not to condemn all concentrations above this level, but
merely to identify areas in the economy where official inquiry appears to
be justified. For this limited purpose, tests which are easy to apply
may be satisfactory, even though the determination of the critical point
on the spectrum of concentration depends largely on the subjective
reactions of experienced persons. An example of such a crude index
may be found in the third table appended to this Article; the table is
based on the Federal Trade Commission's 1947 report on the concen-
tration of productive facilities.' The FTC considers as "extreme"
concentration any situation in which the three largest companies control
more than sixty per cent of the "net capital assets" in the industry.10
With this brief summary of the state of American economic
thought on oligopoly, let us turn to a review of the law relating to
oligopoly. It is notable, in the first place, that neither American nor
typical European legislation speaks in terms of "oligopoly." This is
entirely understandable in view of the lack of specific content which
can be given to the term. Nor do American statutes use words like
''concentration' or "dominant firm," such as are found in European
law. One might even conclude from certain statements and decisions
of our Supreme Court that there is a positive determination to refrain
from giving legal effect to the state of concentration in an industry.
"Mere size . . . is not an offense against the Sherman Act unless
magnified to the point at which it amounts to a monopoly . .
8 See also the elaborate statistical analysis of concentration in the largest 4, 8,
and 20 companies in each industry in SuBcomm. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY,
SENATE COMM1!. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON CONCEN-
TRATION IN AME .ICAN INDUSTRY (Comm. Print 1957).
9 FTC, op. cit. supra note 2, at 21.
10 FTC, op. cit. smpra note 2, at 17.
"1United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932).
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declared Mr. Justice Cardozo in 1932. And earlier, the Supreme Court
had declined to order dissolution of the United States Steel Corporation
although the company was the result of an illegal consolidation of
numerous, huge, fully integrated steel plants into a single organization
with fifty per cent of the national steel capacity."2 In United States v.
National Lead Co.,'8 the Court rejected a dissolution proposal with the
comment that there had been "no showing that four major competing
units would be preferable to two . . . . " ' And Judge Learned
Hand's famous opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America '5
declared that even one hundred per cent control would not necessarily
violate the Sherman Act, if, for example, the defendant achieved this
position without purposeful action designed to exclude others. Assum-
ing such baneful purpose, it would still be necessary to find virtually
complete and unified control o! the relevant business in order to con-
vict the defendant as a monopolist; ninety per cent of the market would
be enough, but "it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would
be enough; and certainly thirty-three percent is not." '6 It would be
difficult to imagine a greater contradiction than we find between this
judicial declaration that the law permits one firm to control a third of
the business in aluminum and the Kaysen-Turner hypothesis that a
business is prima facie over-concentrated if eight firms together control
a third of the business.
The divergence, however, is not as great as appears on its face.
The doctrine that "size alone is not an offense" is a misleading state-
ment of the actual position of American law, which, after all, does give
significant effect to dominance and concentration. The original pro-
nouncement of the innocence of large size was itself coupled with the
qualification that "size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is
not to be ignored . . . . " " This opens the door to something like
the Kaysen-Turner proposal that special scrutiny be given to situations
involving large firms-that is, to industries evidencing an unusual
degree of concentration. A striking application of this principle is
provided by the Alcoa case, where Judge Hand-having first performed
some remarkable manipulations in market analysis to bring the com-
1
2 See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
13332 U.S. 319 (1947).
14 Id. at 352.
15 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
16 Id. at 424.
17 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932); cf. United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 n.10 (1948).
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pany within range of his "monopoly" standard '2--went on to scrutinize
the company's behavior so rigorously as to make even its active,
expansionist policy a dereliction:
Alcoa effectively anticipated and forestalled all competition.
It was not inevitable that it should always anticipate increases in
the demand for ingot and be prepared to supply them. Nothing
compelled it to keep doubling and redoubling its capacity before
others entered the field. It insists that it never excluded com-
petitors; but we can think of no more effective exclusion than
progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and
to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a
great organization
A classic reason for opposing monopoly is that it tends to restrict
supply, yet here, paradoxically, foresighted expansion of capacity is the
element of behavior seized upon to put the company in violation of the
law. Similarly, it is often said that the General Motors Corporation
must "voluntarily" refrain from cutting prices lest it force some
of its competitors out of business. Such propositions, so evidently
at variance with the rationale of free competition, can be understood
only as circumlocutions for an unspoken but nevertheless active concern
about industry structure and concentration. We are formally com-
mitted to a law which forbids only monopolization or evil practices; and
bound as we are by this formal commitment, a way-a fiction if neces-
sary-must be found to attribute evil to giant organizations which
manage to avoid our ordinary list of proscribed commercial restraints.
This attributive process may be seen operating in United States v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,2" where an alleged preemption by
Du Pont of General Motors' purchases of automotive finishes and
fabrics was made the basis for interdicting Du Pont stock control of
General Motors. It is easy to criticize the market analysis expounded
by Mr. Justice Brennan writing for the majority in that case. The
dissenting Justices persuasively demonstrate that Du Pont did not
actually exert control over GM purchases and that, in any event, the
Clayton Act 21 was not intended to apply retroactively to a purchase
of stock twenty years before, when the transaction was lawful. But
' 8 Although Alcoa had been the sole domestic producer of virgin aluminum, its
sales of that product were in competition with "secondary" aluminum, i.e., that re-
covered by the scrap industry. To arrive at a figure of 90% control for Alcoa,
Judge Hand treated this secondary aluminum as a part of the supply controlled by
the company, even though the company had sold the original material from five
to twenty-five years earlier. See 148 F.2d at 422-25.
19 148 F.2d at 430-31.
20353 U.S. 586 (1957).
21§ 7, as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
1960]
38 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
back of the majority view was the commonsense recognition than an
antitrust law which cannot prevent integration of two such financial and
industrial colossi as General Motors and Du Pont would be a farce with
which no Congress ever intended to entertain the American people.
The doctrine of "internal conspiracy" must also be viewed as an
indirect attack on the giant firm. Under this doctrine separately in-
corporated units of an enterprise which is economically and functionally
a single firm may be guilty of an illegal "conspiracy" when they concert
their price and other policies.22 I have not seen this doctrine applied
to any but very large organizations.
As might be expected, a legal policy against concentration which
can be given effect only indirectly and through fictions is likely to
operate erratically. In some sectors of American antitrust law the
judges have evolved rules dealing more explicitly with dominance and
oligopoly. Thus, in interpreting section 3 of the Clayton Act which
forbids exclusive dealing arrangements "where the effect may be to
substantially lessen competition," ' the defendant's leading position in
its market and the adherence of major competitors to parallel policies
have become crucial factors. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
24
the defendant's exclusive dealing contracts were held illegal where it
appeared that defendant was the largest seller in its region-controlling
twenty-three per cent of the sales-and that all other "major suppliers"
followed similar practices, thus "collectively, even though not collu-
sively, preventing a late arrival from wresting away more than an
insignificant portion of the market." 25
2 2 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
cf. Distillers Corp.-Seagrams, Ltd., 50 F.T.C. 738 (1954) (subsidiaries and parent
ordered not to collaborate in pricing). But cf. United States v. Arkansas Fuel Oil
Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.) 169619, at 76496 (D.C. Okla. 1960),
where discussion of a price increase with an officer of one's parent corporation was
held to be "mere approval by a parent corporation . . . [which] does not consti-
tute a per se violation of' the Sherman Act." See the discussion of this case in
text following note 38 infra. See also Schwartz, Relations with Affiliated Customers,
in N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW Sym-
Posium 214 (1952); Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy under the Sherman Act,
63 YALE LJ. 372 (1954).
23 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
24337 U.S. 293 (1949).
2 5 1d. at 309. See Dictograph Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir.
1954), where it was said in interpretation of the Standard Oil case: "Where the
alleged violator dominated or was a leader in the industry, proof of such fact
was, at an early stage, determined to be a sufficient predicate from which to con-
clude that the use of exclusive-dealing contracts was violative of Section 3 and other
factors appear to have been largely ignored. . . . More recently, the Supreme Court
extended the rule to business organizations enjoying a powerful, though clearly
not dominant position . . . ." Cf. Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition-
The Impact of Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States on the Standard
of Legality Under the Clayton Act, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 10 (1949).
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In recent years American merger law has given evidence of
special sensitivity to the acquisition of lesser companies by leading firms,
even when the resulting combinations do not approach the minimum
level of concentration which Judge Hand deemed necessary to constitute
a monopoly.2" But, in contrast to the 'exclusive dealing cases, there
seems to be no tendency to make market dominance or leadership a
sufficient circumstance, standing alone, to establish a violation or prima
facie violation of the merger provisions of section 7 of the Clayton
Act.2 7  The size of firms involved and the structure of the industry are
merely circumstances to be considered with many others in determining
whether the merger will probably impair competition "substantially."
Although oligopolistic structure appears to be significant in varying
degrees with respect to exclusive dealing and mergers, it receives almost
no recognition in our laws dealing with price discrimination-and this
despite the fact that the relevant language of section 2 of the Clayton
Act,2" as amended by the Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act,29
is parallel to that of sections 3 and 7. A dominant petroleum firm may
justify discrimination among its customers on the ground that it is
meeting a competitive offer.30  A manufacturer producing upwards of
sixty per cent of burner controls may justify price differentials by
showing that the disadvantaged customers were nevertheless thriving,
and that therefore competition was not being impaired. 1
Still another way in which American antitrust law has adapted
itself to the phenomenon of oligopoly is by the doctrine of "conspiracy"
based on "conscious parallel action." Firms which persistently follow
parallel business policies will be treated as if they had agreed upon those
2 6 See, e.g., American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259
F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958) (combination would be fourth largest in country, supplying
13% of sugar in its region); United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721
(E.D. Mo. 1959), prob. juris. noted, 363 U.S. 825 (1960) (fourth largest shoe pro-
ducer having 5% of total production combining with another firm having 0.5% of total
production and 1.2%o of total retail shoe sales, the latter attribute making it the largest
family shoe chain retailer); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp.
576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (combination of second and sixth largest steel firms) ; Hamilton
Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738
(2d Cir. 1953) (combination controlling 20% of nationally advertised jeweled watches).
27 For a criticism of the FTC's failure-notwithstanding the parallel language of
§§ 3 and 7-to conform merger law to exclusive dealing law in this respect, see
STAFF OF SUBcomm. No. 5, HOUSE Comm. ON THE JuDicARY, 84TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
INTERIFM REPORT ON CORPORATE AND BANK MERGERS 19-25 (Comm. Print 1955).
28 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), (b) (1958).
29-49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1958).
30 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). Perhaps the disapproval of
"systematic" discrimination, allegedly to meet competition, operates with special force
against oligopolies. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); FTC v.
A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d
43 (8th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
31Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951),
petition for cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
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policies, at least where there is some evidence that they consciously
faced the policy issue as a common problem." On the other hand, the
inference of conspiracy from parallel action can be rebutted by showing
that identical commercial conditions facing the separate firms compelled
them to act identically."
Closely related to the doctrine of conspiracy based on conscious
parallel action is the proposal to make "price leadership" presumptive
evidence of conspiracy between the price leader and his followers.34
In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 5 the three largest cigarette
companies were convicted of jointly.monopolizing the cigarette business
by employing, in common, certain buying practices allegedly designed
to prevent the manufacture of cheaper cigarettes and by slavishly imitat-
ing each other's price moves in the distribution of cigarettes. The
companies' insistence that identity of price movement was compelled by
competition rather than a manifestation of monopoly was rendered
somewhat ridiculous when the president of the American Tobacco
Company testified that not only was he compelled to reduce his price
whenever his rivals announced a reduction, lest he lose sales, but also
that he was compelled to increase prices when Reynolds raised theirs,
since otherwise Reynolds' increased profits would enable them to spend
more money on advertising and so again deprive him of sales. 6 Absurd
as this seems, economists would probably support the proposition that
oligopolists in this situation have no alternative but to arrive, with or
without agreement, at a common price, and that it will be a high price
in relation to cost. Indeed, a study of the sequel to the Tobacco case
revealed that the companies followed essentially the same price policies
after the case as they did before, and increased their combined share of
the national market from sixty-eight per cent to seventy-six per cent.
3 7
The unreliability of the parallel action and price leadership approach to
32 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (common terms
of licensing second-run showings of films of dominant movie producers); Milgran v.
Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 206 (1952) (deny-
ing first-run showings to drive-in theaters). See Givens, Parallel Business Conduct
Under the Sherman Act, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 273 (1960) ; Note, Conscious Parallelismn
-Fact or Fancy?, 3 STAN. L. REv. 679 (1951).
33 Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 942 (1950) (identical pricing by "competing" milk companies explicable
by uniform federally regulated price paid to farmers for raw milk, uniform wages
paid to workers represented by single union, standardized product, and production
conditions regulated by health ordinances).
84 HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS 44 (TNEC Monograph No. 38, 1941).
s,328 U.S. 781 (1946).
861d. at 805.
87NIcHoLLs, PRICE POLICIES IN THE CIGARETTE INDUSTRY 402 (1951).
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oligopoly is illustrated by a recent case 8 in which defendant oil com-
panies were acquitted of charges that they unlawfully conspired to fix
and raise prices following the Suez crisis. Two of the companies had
raised their prices on the same day and others followed promptly. But
the court found that the closing of the Suez Canal and certain cost in-
creases prior to the price increase constituted "economic justification"
sufficient to prevent the evidence of an "agreement" from rising above
the level of suspicion.
One trouble with inferring or presuming conspiracy from parallel
action is that it seems to lead logically to remedial action directed
against the presumed conspiracy. It assumes that if the parties are
compelled to act "independently" they will behave differently. But we
know that in a sufficiently concentrated oligopoly the distinction be-
tween independent and concerted action tends to evaporate.39 The
theoretical error in diagnosing the problem as one of conspiracy rather
than of structure is accompanied by a practical problem of devising
effective controls. One can hardly order the "leader" to stop setting
and publicizing its own prices. It would be equally difficult and unfair
to enjoin "followers" from charging as much as their big leader-and
they obviously cannot charge more.
A final illustration of the equivocal and ineffective response of
American law to the problem of oligopoly and parallel pricing is pro-
vided by the so-called fair trade laws which authorize suppliers to set
resale prices. These laws reinforce the tendency of concentrated in-
dustries to operate on the basis of parallel high pricing by the large
firms. They do this by eliminating an important source of pressure
for independent, competitive, downward price adjustments at the pro-
ducer level-namely, pressure by retailers whose profit margin has been
cut by the competition of other retailers. It has often been observed,
for example, that gasoline "price wars" at the retail level precipitate
competitive wholesale price reductions, which the supplier is compelled
to make in order to enable his distributor to maintain his gallonage.
"Fair trade" helps, therefore, to reduce the number of entrepreneurs
whose decisions must be aligned in order to stabilize prices. In ciga-
rettes, toothpaste, liquor, and consumer durables, the number of price
makers is reduced by fair trade to fewer than a half-dozen giant pro-
ducers. Inasmuch as these producers have already succeeded in par-
38 United States v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade
Cas.) 1169619 (D. Okla. 1960).
39 See Arr'y GEN. NAT'L COmm. ANTITRUST REP. 326 (1955): 'When sellers
are few, even in the absence of conspiracy, the market itself may not show many of
the characteristics of effective competition, and in fact may not be effectively com-
petitive in the economic sense."
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tially insulating their products from competition with each other by
heavy advertising expenditures designed to persuade the consumer that
each trademark identifies a unique product, the insistence of the fair
trade laws that products be in "free and open competition with products
of the same general class" is rendered ineffective.4"
In sum, the failure of American legislation to deal explicitly with
the problem of oligopoly has not wholly prevented the judicial develop-
ment of legal answers to oligopoly but has made that development in-
consistent and unpredictable. Even legislation especially designed to
slow up the process of economic concentration, like recent antimerger
laws, has fallen short of its goal because of the failure of antitrust
proponents to face up directly to the problem of oligopoly. These
antimerger laws may actually aggravate the evils at which they were
aimed, because only future mergers are affected. The great combines
in steel, motors, and banking have their dominance confirmed by anti-
merger acts which inhibit the amalgamation of smaller units but fail to
provide for dissolution of the very amalgamations whose formation
stimulated enactment of the laws. This has been the history of the
Clayton Act and its amendments as well as of recent legislation 1
against holding company expansion in the fields of banking and savings
and loan associations. Only in the field of public utility holding com-
panies did the Roosevelt administration succeed in pushing through a
divestiture program to confine each enterprise to "a single integrated
public-utility system" or, with special approval, contiguous systems
where the combined operation "is not so large . . . as to impair the
advantages of localized management, efficient operation, or the effective-
ness of regulation." 42
It remains to examine cognate aspects of certain European legisla-
tion. It is noteworthy, in the first place, that Europe has faced the
problem of oligopoly squarely and explicitly, without resort to fictions
of evil intent, strained constructions of conspiracy, or bizarre findings
of anticompetitive activity in plant expansion or price-cutting. The
British Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control)
Act of 1948 " was made applicable to situations where a third or more
40 Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Home Util. Co., 138 F. Supp. 670, 677 (D. Md.),
aff'd in part, modified in part, remanded, 234 F.2d 766 (4th Cir. 1956) (manu-
facturer's fair-traded product in free and open competition with others in its class
despite substantially complete fair trade coverage of all similar products).
41 Bank Holding Company Act, 70 Stat. 133 (1956), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-48 (1958),
26 U.S.C. §§ 1101-03 (1958) ; 73 Stat. 691 (1959), 12 U.S.C. § 1730(a) (Supp. 1959)
(saving and loan holding companies).
42 Public Utility Holding Companies Act of 1935, § 11(b) (1), 49 Stat. 820,
15 U.S.C. § 79k (1958).
43 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 66.
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of the market is supplied either by one person or "[by] two or more
persons who, whether voluntarily or not, and whether by agreement or
arrangement or not, so conduct their respective affairs as in any way to
prevent or restrict competition . . . " So also, section 22 of the
1957 German Act Against Restraint of Competition defines "a market-
dominating enterprise" as one which is not subject to substantial com-
petition or two or more enterprises insofar as there is, either in general
or specific markets, no substantial competition in fact between them,45
if collectively they are not subject to substantial competition by other
firms. Sections 23 and 24 of the act 4 give further specificity to the
concept of dominating enterprise by requiring report to the Cartel
Authority of any merger where the resulting combine would have as
much as twenty per cent of the market. The Cartel Authority investi-
gates the likelihood that the combine will obtain market dominance in
the section 22 sense. And article 24 of the Economic Competition Act
of the Netherlands takes cognizance of situations where "a dominant
position [of economic power] exists whose consequences conflict with
the general interest." 17 "Dominant position" is defined in section 1 as
"a de facto or de jure relationship in trade or industry which entails a
predominant influence by one or more owners of enterprises on a
market for commodities or services in the Netherlands." 48 The treaties
establishing the new economic communities of Europe likewise contain
special provisions for "enterprises which, in law or in fact, have or
acquire . . . a dominant position which protects them from effective
competition . ... " '9
Once it has been determined that the firms in an industry "in fact"
conduct themselves in a noncompetitive fashion, they become subject,
under typical European "antitrust" legislation, to a degree of govern-
ment control of business decision, including even price controls. The
44 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 1948,
11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 66, §§ 3(2) (supply of goods), 4(2) (processing of goods); cf.
§ 5, which in relation to exports required "agreements or arrangements, whether
legally enforceable or not."
45 Act of July 27, 1957, translated and reprinted in 1 GUIDE To LEGISLATION ON
RESTRIcTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, pt. D at 13 (European Productivity Agency of the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation 1960) [hereinafter cited as RE-
smi cIVE PRACTICES LEGISLATION].
46 Act of July 27, 1957, translated and reprinted in 1 REsTcTIn PRACTICES
LEGISLATION, pt. D at 14.
47Act of June 28, 1956, as amended, Act of July 16, 1958, translated and re-
printed in 2 RESTRIcTIVE PRACTICES LEGISLATION, pt. NL at 10.
48 Act of June 28, 1956, as amended, Act of July 16, 1958, translated and re-
printed in 2 REsTRIcTIVE PRACTICES LEGISLATION, pt. NL at 1.
49Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18,
1951, art. 66(7), in ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, DOCUMENTS ON INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAmS 1951, at 173 (1954) ; cf. Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, March 25, 1957, art. 86, in 51 Am. J. INT'L L. 865 (1957).
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British Monopolies Commission's Report on the Supply of Dental
Goods found that the Amalgamated Dental Company and its affiliates
were "not . . . a monopoly in the ordinary sense," " but recom-
mended that the group should "reduce the prices of . . . porcelain
teeth." "' While the Monopolies Commission's recommendations do
not have the force of law, a recent account in the London Economist
concerning a Commission report on the fertilizer industry notes that
Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., was induced to submit to "volun-
tary price control." 52 In Germany market-dominating enterprises may
be required to desist from "misuse" of their market position in pricing
or in terms or conditions of sale. 53  "Misuse" does not imply any sub-
jective evil purpose or knowledge that the conduct amounts to misuse.54
In Holland firms in "a dominant position" may have their prices and
terms of sale regulated even to the point of a requirement that goods or
services be supplied "at the customary cash price on the market con-
cerned." " And the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel
Community is authorized to fix the prices, conditions of sale, manufac-
turing and delivery schedules of dominant firms, where this becomes
necessary "to prevent use of such position for purposes contrary to
[the Coal and Steel Treaty]." " The purposes of the Treaty, listed
in articles 2 and 3, include expanding production, prevention of dis-
crimination, and the securing of "the lowest prices which are possible"
without shifting cost burdens unfairly.
Nothing could be further from American antitrust ideology than
the idea of official intervention in pricing and other economic decisions
of entrepreneurs where no malpractice or evil intent appears. Yet, just
as we have arrived by indirection at a rough policy relating to oligopoly
50 
MONOPOLIES AND RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES Comm'N, REPORT ON THE SUPPLY
OF DENTAL GOODS 67 (1950).
51Id. at 69. On the Monopolies Commission's tolerant view of concerted pric-
ing, see Grunfeld & Yamey, United Kingdom, in ANTITRUST LAws-A COMPARATIVE
SYmPoSiUm 340, 382 (Friedmann ed. 1956); cf. In re Water-Tube Boilermakers'
Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 285 (1959), 108 U. PA. L. REv. 924 (1960) (application
of the "rule of reason" to price agreements under the Restrictive Trade Practices
Act of 1956).
52 194 THE EcoNOMIST 741 (1960). The report itself was not available to the
writer when this Article was prepared.
53Law Against Restraint of Competition §22(3), Law of July 27, 1957, trans-
lated and reprinted in 1 RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES LEGISLATION, pt. D at 13, 14.
54Bartholomeyczik, Market Dominating Practices, in M1i3LLER-HENNEBERG-
SCHWARTZ, GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERSBESCHRXNKUNGEN 468, 529 (1958).
55Economic Competition Act § 24, Act of June 28, 1956, as amended, Act of
July 16, 1958, translated and reprinted in 2 RESTRCTrIVE PRACnCES LEGISLATION, pt.
NL at 10.
56 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951,
art. 66(7), in ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS 1951, at 173 (1954).
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and parallel action (although our statutes do not speak in these terms),
so we are beginning to impose upon powerful corporations affirmative
obligations not unlike those expressly provided for in advanced
European legislation. Thus, a giant integrated aluminum company
may be required to maintain a margin between the price at which it
sells sheet aluminum and the price at which it sells fabricated products
sufficient to permit independent fabricators to survive." The officials
of a mammoth broadcasting network, which owns TV stations and at
the same time provides network programs on a contract basis to
hundreds of affiliated stations, have avowed that whenever the network
proposes to buy an affiliated station it pays the first price asked by the
owner.5" This appears to be a recognition that its economic position,
based on the power to discontinue the vital affiliation, is so over-
whelming that the network stands in jeopardy under the antitrust laws
if it tries to bargain for a lower purchase price. The dominant position
of the Eastman Kodak Company in production of color film led to an
antitrust decree requiring it to desist from including a processing
charge in the price of film so that film users would be free to patronize
independent processors." The right of large firms to select their
customers-for example, to refrain from dealing with distributors who
cut resale prices-has been under attack in Congress and has been
whittled down in recent Supreme Court decisions."
On the other hand, there are notable cases where American
tribunals liave failed to intervene effectively to control the exercise of
oligopoly power. Thus, the General Electric Company was permitted
to dictate the price at which retailers sold its electric lamps, as well as
the price of electric lamps manufactured and sold by its giant competitor-
licensee, Westinghouse,"' although the Court might well have drawn a
distinction between the right of small patentees to include price-fixing
clauses in patent licenses and the right of industrial giants to dominate
a market through contractual arrangements based on patents. The
General Electric case has never been directly overruled, although its
57 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1954 Trade Cas. 67745 (S.D.
N.Y.).
58 Brief for Appellants, pp. 23-24, Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., appeal
docketed, No. 15379, D.C. Cir., Sept. 25, 1959 (quoting depositions). For an illustra-
tion of the allegedly coercive use of network broadcasting power, see United States
v. Radio Corp of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
59 United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1954 Trade Cas. 67920 (W.D.N.Y.).60 See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); STAFF OF SENATE
SELECT CoMM. oN SMALL BUSINESS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESs., THE RIGHT TO BuY
(Comm. Print 1959). See also A. C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d 1 (7th
Cir. 1959) ; United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
61United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); United States v.
General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 817-27 (D.N.J. 1949).
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authority is much shaken by later decisions which do give effect to
oligopoly considerations. 2
The leading case of Associated Press v. United States 6presented
in reality a problem in oligopoly control of national and international
news, for such news was available from only three agencies of which
AP was by far the most powerful. Yet, the matter was disposed of on
the narrow basis of a "conspiracy" among the newspaper members of
AP to "discriminate" against competitors of existing members in
passing on the competitors' applications to join AP. Accordingly,
although AP was convicted of violating the Sherman Act, the Court's
order went no further than to prohibit the discrimination, leaving
undisturbed AP's exclusive right to distribute news originating with its
powerful membership and its exclusive arrangements with foreign news
syndicates. It is not surprising that the number of American news
syndicates was soon reduced to two. 4
The uneasy and inadequate use of the antitrust laws to impose
affirmative controls on oligopoly has led to a variety of proposals to
change and supplement the law. Some seek to inaugurate a program
of deconcentration. Kaysen and Turner, for example, call for a declara-
tion that "an unreasonable degree of market power as such [is]
illegal." " They propose that, in passing upon the legality of mergers,
a twenty per cent share of a market be considered prima facie excessive
concentration. 6 "Market power shall be conclusively presumed where,
for five years or more, one company has accounted for 50 percent or
more of annual sales in the market, or four or fewer companies have
accounted for 80 percent of such sales." 67 Although endorsing divesti-
ture and dissolution as remedies, they provide a number of defenses
under which considerable concentration could be justified as reasonable
-for example, where concentration is necessary to achieve economies
62 United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) (four Justices favored overruling General
Electric); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); Newburgh Moire
Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1956) (price alignment of three-fifths
of industry invalidates licensing agreement).
63326 U.S. 1 (1945).
64See 1958-1 TRADE REG. REP. 14207.105, reporting Department of Justice
approval of the merger of United Press and International News Service, the latter
being in "failing circumstances." Cf. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), where it was held that a newspaper publisher with
half the readership and 40% of the advertising in New Orleans was not so
"dominant" as to require it to desist from using the "unit rule" in the sale of adver-
tising. Under this rule an advertiser who wished space in the publisher's morning
paper had to buy space also in his afternoon paper. The competing aftern6on paper
soon expired. See Death of the Times-Star, Time, Aug. 4, 1958, p. 47.
65 KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN EcoNoMIc AND LEGAL ANALYSIs
111 (1959).
66 Id. at 99, 133; cf. Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA.
L. REv. 176, 182 (1955).67 KAYSEN & TURNER, op. cit. supra note 65, at 98.
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of scale, or dissolution of a firm concentrated in a single plant is not
physically practicable.
I have a mild preference for supplementing section 2 of the
Sherman Act with a legislative program that differs somewhat from
the Kaysen-Turner proposal. I would begin with a narrower class of
enterprises. A firm would be subject to reorganization if: (1) it has
assets in excess of one billion dollars; (2) it operates in a basic in-
dustry; and (3) it has twenty per cent of the national market or is
one of the four leading firms which in the aggregate have fifty per
cent of the market. The statute would specify the industries which
the legislature deems basic-for instance, steel and automobiles.
There is nothing magical about the requirement of assets in excess
of one billion dollars. I am less concerned with the precise figure than
with indicating the principle of the legislation. 8 The figure might be
a half billion, either generally or in selected industries which Congress
might designate on the basis of past antitrust experience. In deter-
mining a firm's assets, it would be necessary to have rules declaring
what affiliations between separately incorporated firms should cause
them to be treated as a single enterprise.
The firms thus singled out should be reorganized under a criterion
stiffer than the Kaysen-Turner standard of "unreasonable market
power." The test should be whether they are larger than can be
justified by economies of scale in production and distribution, with the
burden of proof placed on the firm; that is, if a firm falls within the
standards I have formulated, it must prove that its size leads to lower
costs of production or distribution, or it will be reorganized into smaller
business units.
This proposal places no absolute limit on size of firm, but merely
institutes inquiry where industrial giants operate in overly concentrated
basic industries. Firms of more than a billion dollars in assets would
be left untouched if such size is shown to be economical. A super-
billion firm, which is not dominant in a basic industry, is left free to
expand in fields dominated by other giants, thus encouraging these
powerful units to invade each other's markets.
The proposed billion-dollar figure is not an imputation of evil
beginning at that level, but only a device to limit the initial administra-
tive effort to a reasonable number of cases where economic power has
most obviously gone very far. Experience with these firms should
equip the regulatory agency to expand controls if that should prove
desirable. Naming a figure like one billion dollars will also enable
6 8 However, note the discussion of Kaysen and Turner's reasons for rejecting any
such limitation in Professor Fuchs' book review appearing in the book review section
of this issue.
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management and counsel to plan a firm's development with an eye to
the law's requirements. Thus, as the critical size is approached, con-
sideration may be given to voluntary divestiture of peripheral activities,
by "spinning off" or other arrangements. Or expansion can be di-
rected into areas where the firm will not be one of the dominant
oligopolists.
The deconcentration program I envision would be carried out by
an administrative agency, presumably the Federal Trade Commission,
in civil proceedings. The criminal and treble-damage provisions of the
Sherman 69 and Clayton 7 Acts are inappropriate to cases of this
character involving no imputations of misbehavior or illicit monopolistic
intent.71 Initially, at least, the program would be confined to the manu-
facturing and mining industries, in view of the special considerations
applicable to regulated transportation businesses and public utilities.
Insurance and banking, where some of the very largest firms are
found,72 present some unique problems as to both the efficacy of present
regulation and the measurement of concentration, so that further in-
quiry may be needed before assigning responsibility for a deconcentra-
tion program in these fields.
To restrain the power of very large organizations that would
remain in existence under any conceivable decentralization program,
there is need for a statutory declaration that exclusive dealing, mergers,
price discrimination, restrictive patent licensing, and other anticompeti-
tive practices are illegal when engaged in by dominant or leading firms,
although smaller firms might be able to justify the same practices as
reasonable or involving only minimal effect on competition.7
Such proposals, however strongly they may be resisted in the
United States, remain in the mainstream of antitrust tradition,
strengthening the proscriptions against concentration of economic
power and unfair practices. In quite a different tradition are pending
proposals to subject price increases in major concentrated industries to
a preaudit by an administrative agency or legislative committee.
4
69 Ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890).
70 §4, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
71 Professor Fuchs reaches this same conclusion in his review of Kaysen and
Turner's book in the book review section of this issue.
72 E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (over $15 billion in assets) ; Bank of America
(over $10 billion in assets).
73 See ATT'Y GEN. NATL COMm. ANTITRUST REP. 392 (1955) (dissent of L. B.
Schwartz).
74 See S. 1237, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), which would, if enacted, amend the
Employment Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 23, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-24 (1958), to read in part:
"It shall be the duty and function of the [Council of Economic Advisers] to hold
public hearings concerning (a) price increases, proposed in industries where most of
the output.is produced by relatively few firms, which increases appear to threaten
economic stability . ..
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Such a measure was suggested by Professor Galbraith in the course of
Senator Kefauver's hearings on administered prices. 5 These hearings
disclosed, for example, that the steel companies did not offer each other
rivalry in pricing but, on the contrary, were able through the price
leadership of the United States Steel Corporation to raise prices more
quickly than costs increased, even in a declining market-a classic
example of oligopolistic parallel pricing.
The pending price-notification bill " falls somewhere between the
British Monopolies Commission postaudit of oligopoly pricing, which
leads to "voluntary" price reductions, and the strong Dutch provisions
for regulated pricing and production. I wish that I could be more hope-
ful that the bill would make an effective contribution to solution of the
problem of parallel pricing by dominant firms. It seems more likely to set
up a perpetual and inconclusive political debate. But if the government,
having exhausted its best efforts to maintain workable competition,
must inquire into pricing, it seems obvious that continuous administra-
tive supervision is essential and that the mission of an agency charged
with such supervision should be clearly and narrowly defined. It
should be directed to concern itself primarily with large, basic, and
highly concentrated industries, to report regularly to the legislature on
such matters as costs, profits, and freedom of entry, and to make
recommendations on reorganization, taxation (to recapture excess
profits), tariff policy (to dilute the oligopoly by encouraging foreign
competition), and procurement (so that government purchasing does
not reinforce oligopoly). The very prospect of this kind of supervision
and publicity would do much to induce moderation in the exercise of
oligopoly power, while the information obtained would lay the basis for
the continuous evolution of rational legal control of over-concentrated
industries.
Although the price-notification bill has its difficulties and breaks
with the antitrust tradition, it contains an idea that may be seminal for
the future development of antitrust law. It suggests that the signal for
governmental concern and the starting point of official inquiry should
be how the prices of important products are actually behaving. If they
are rigid, or move in disregard of costs, or are set at levels that dis-
courage a desirable expansion of demand, may we not move from that
observation directly to an appropriate official response without going
through the intermediate steps of determining the "boundaries" of a
75See Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, Report on Administered Prices in the Steel Indestry, S. REP. No. 1387, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Schwartz, Adninistered Prices, Oligopoly and the Sherman
Act, in 12 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 17 (1958).
76 S. 1237, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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"market," making the difficult measurement of "concentration" in the
market, and adopting some controversial criterion of excessive con-
centration? " It will be recalled that Kaysen and Turner arrive at
their criterion of dangerous degree of concentration by observing that
most markets concentrated to that degree are "likely" to behave
oligopolistically "to a significant degree." If economists can recognize
oligopolistic, antisocial pricing, a law of the future may well provide
that appropriate counter-measures be taken, including but not by any
means limited to reorganizing the leading firms.
77 Compare the complete integration of "antitrust" regulation into a general
regime of price regulation in Norway. The Norwegian authorities, looling primarily
at price behavior rather than at structure, may even encourage consolidations, agree-
ments to curtail price competition, or group boycotts of foreign firms, where they
believe such action is beneficial to the public interest. See Eckhoff, Norway, in
AxTrRUST LAws-A COMPARATI S osium 281, 298-305 (Friedmann ed. 1956).
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APPENDIX I
HIGH CONCENTRATION IN AmERICAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES *
Value of Shipments
Industry
Primary lead .........................
Primary copper ......................
Flat glass ............................
Primary aluminum ..................
Typewriters .........................
Hard-surface floor coverings ..........
Locomotives and parts ...............
Electric lamps (bulbs) ...............
Synthetic fibers .......................
Tel. and tel. equipment ................
Steam engines and turbines ............
Chewing gum ........................
Salt .................................
Tires and inner tubes .................
Corn wet milling products ............
Cereal breakfast foods ................
Tin cans and other tinware ............
Sewing machines .....................
Aluminum rolling and drawing ........
Primary nonferrous metals, n.e.c .......
Transformers ........................
Computing and related machines ......
Tractors .............................
Primary zinc .........................
Compressed and liquified gases .........
(thousands
of dollars) t
(305,000)
(490,000)
499,267
464,754
141,677
159,679
365,169
309,650
1,202,343
775,469
426,197
153,524
71,636
1,621,917
435,966
330,970
1,340,605
107,492
760,416
396,004
628,917
501,311
1,070,836
205,039
195,390
Mininmi
Concentration Ratio
First First
8 Firms $ 20 Firms
100 (6)
100 (9) -
99 100
99 100
98 99
97 100
97 99
96 99
95 99
94 97
94 99
93 99
93 99
91 99
90 97
89 98
89 96
89 95
87 93
86 95
86 93
84 96
84 94
83 99
83 90
The remaining Kaysen and Turner data may be summarized as follows:
Range of
Number of Minimum Concentration
Industries of First 8 Firms
14 ................................. 75-82
8 ................................. 70-74
11 ................................. 60-69
14 ................................. 50-59
33 ................................. 33-49
* Based on KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 275-80 (1959).
t Values of shipments stated within parentheses are estimated.
$ Where impossible to compute the concentration ratio for eight firms, the number
of firms used is given parenthetically.
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APPENDIX II
DEGE OF CONCENTRATION IN LARGEST AMERICAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES *
Value of Shipments
Industry
Meat products ......................
Blast furnaces, steel works, and rolling
m ills ...........................
Aircraft and aircraft equipment .......
Motor vehicles and parts ............
Misc. food and kindred products ......
Aircraft engines and propellors ......
Organic chemicals, n.e.c ..............
Cigarettes and tobacco ...............
Malt and malt liquors ...............
Misc. rubber products ...............
Pharmaceutical preparations .........
Insulated wire and cable .............
Tires and inner tubes ................
Inorganic chemicals, n.e.c. ...........
Soap, glycerin, cleaning and polishing
preparations, and related products ..
Radios and related products ..........
Paints, varnishes, and allied products ..
Plastic materials ....................
Refrigeration equipment .............
Periodicals .........................
Tin cans and other tinware ..........
Motors and generators ..............
Coke and by-products ...............
Sugar ..............................
Synthetic fibers .....................
Copper rolling and drawing ..........
Tractors ...........................
Farm machinery (except tractors) ...
Electric control apparatus ...........
(thousands
of dollars) t
12,682,723
(9,400,000)
8,412,520
(6,620,000)
3,700,349
3,381,551
3,231,191
2,816,216
2,047,945
1,956,694
1,946,672
1,772,935
1,621,917
1,599,859
1,590,527
(1,530,000)
1,503,728
1,463,460
(1,400,000)
1,394,073
1,340,605
1,338,447
1,247,565
1,217,425
1,202,343
1,123,540
1,070,836
1,060,306
1,057,327
Minimum
Concentration Ratio
First First
8 Firms 20 Firms t
32 43
65 (24)
70 (24)
78
48
91 (24)
64
93
54
53 (24)
55
61 (24)
99
60
66 (28)
54
48
78
70
53
96
70
92
94 (28)
99
89
94
60
72
* Based on KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 275-80 (1959).
"t Values of shipments stated within parentheses are estimated.
$ Where impossible to compute the concentration ratio for 20 firms, the number of
firms used is given parenthetically.
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APPENDIX III
EXAMPLES OF EXTREME CONCENTRATION IN AMERICAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES *
Industry Concentration Ratio t
Aluminum ..................................... 100.0
Tin cans and other tinware ...................... 95.3
Linoleum ...................................... 92.1
Copper smelting and refining .................... 88.5
Cigarettes ..................................... 77.6
Distilled liquors ................................ 72.4
Plumbing equipment and supplies ................ 71.3
Rubber tires and tubes .......................... 70.3
Office and store machines and devices ............ 69.5
Motor vehicles ................................. 68.7
Biscuits, crackers, and pretzels .................. 67.7
Agricultural machinery ......................... 66.6
Meat products ................................. 64.0
* From FTC, REPORT ON THE CONCENTRATION OF PRODUC-
TIvE FAcILITIEs 17 (1947).
t Per cent of industry's net capital assets held by three
largest firms.
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